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**Embargo limits drilling now – plan unlocks large-scale Cuban production.**

**Padgett ‘8** Tim Padgett joined TIME in 1996 as Mexico City bureau chief covering Latin America. In 1999 he moved to Florida to become TIME’s Miami & Latin America bureau chief, reporting on the hemisphere from Tallahassee to Tierra del Fuego. He has chronicled Mexico’s democratization and drug war as well as the rise of Latin leaders like Lula and Hugo Chavez, “How Cuba’s Oil Find Could Change the US Embargo”¶ Time Magazine – Oct. 23, 2008 – internally quoting Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, a Cuba oil analyst at the University of Nebraska-Omaha. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,¶ 1853252,00.html#ixzz13Li5cosN

The Spanish energy company Repsol-YPF has entered into a production-sharing agreement with Cupet and is scheduled to start drilling the first real well in the EEZ next year. Other international firms, including Norway's StatoilHidro and India's Oil & Natural Gas Corp., are part of the Repsol-led consortium. Venezuela's state-run Petroleos de Venezuela is considered a lesser player because it has little deep-water drilling experience. (China is also interested but so far only involved in onshore drilling in Cuba.) Cuba is now in important negotiations with Brazil's Petrobras, which just made its own multibillion-barrel oil find off its coast near Rio de Janeiro and could, analysts say, be the major offshore drilling partner for Cuba if it jumps in.¶ Still, the concessions so far represent **less than a quarter** of the 59 drilling blocks that Cuba hopes to exploit in the 43,000-sq.-mi. (112,000 sq km) EEZ. Analysts say one reason is the daunting infrastructural difficulties facing any company that drills in Cuba: firms have to bring much more of their own capital, equipment, technology and on-the-ground know-how than usual. This year's severe hurricane damage in Cuba has made the situation worse. Canada's Sherritt, in fact, recently dropped out of its four-block contract. "Who else is going to be willing to actually come in and take the risk in Cuba?" says Benjamin-Alvarado. "In terms of proximity and technology, **the only people** really **able to** do it to the extent the Cubans need **are the Americans."**

**That trades-off with US- Mid-East oil ties.**

**Alhaiji and Maris ‘4**

[Dr. A. F. Alhajji is an energy economist and George Patton Chair of Business and Economics at the College of Business Administration at Ohio Northern, Terry L. Maris is the founding executive director of the Center for Cuban. Business Studies and professor of management, “The Future of Cuba’s Energy Sector,” Cuba Today, 2004, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/cubatodaybookcomplete.pdf#page=105]

The current economic, political, and social trends in Cuba indicate that¶ energy consumption will increase substantially in the future. Transition to a¶ market economy would accelerate this trend. In this article the word “transition”¶ refers to any movement towards a market economy. It does not necessarily¶ mean regime change.¶ The proximity of Cuba to the United States and the possibility of **massive**¶ **oil deposits** in Cuban waters will have a tangible impact on political, economic,¶ and social environments, not only in Cuba, but in the whole region.¶ The discovery of commercial deposits of oil would affect Cuba’s economy on¶ one hand and US energy policy and energy security on the other. If US-Cuba¶ relations improve in the future, discovery of large oil deposits could affect the¶ energy trade patterns between the two countries and affect oil trade between¶ the US and other oil producing countries, especially in the Middle East.

**That causes Saudi Prolif.**

**Guzansky ’13** Yoel Guzansky is a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University. His main research area is Gulf security. He has also served as Iran coordinator at Israel's National Security Council. His recent publications include The Gulf States in a Changing Strategic Environment (2012), One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications, and The Gulf States: Between Iran and the West – Middle East Quarterly¶ Spring 2013, pp. 59-64 – available at: http://www.meforum.org/3512/saudi-arabia-pakistan-nuclear-weapon

Continued Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, Iraq's increasing alignment with Tehran, and an expedited U.S. exit from Afghanistan are all changing the Saudi strategic landscape. The Obama administration's "lead from behind" approach in Libya and its hesitation to get involved in the Syrian civil war all contribute to a reassessment of U.S. commitments. With the U.S. "pivot to Asia"—taking the form of a series of military, economic, commercial, and diplomatic initiatives aimed at contending with the rising power of China—and a changing global energy map due to expansion of oil and natural gas production in the United States, Riyadh and others are beginning to prepare for a post-U.S. Middle East.¶ According to recent reports, Washington is considering expanding its nuclear cooperation with Riyadh on the basis of a 2008 memorandum of understanding: In exchange for foregoing the operation of nuclear fuel cycles on its soil, Saudi Arabia was to receive nuclear assistance.[33] Such a move, should it come to pass, may be meant to persuade Riyadh to abandon its strategic goals, prevent other players from gaining a foothold in the attractive Saudi market, and challenge Tehran's nuclear policy. The United States is still Saudi Arabia's most effective security support, but if Washington distances itself from regional matters, the gradual entrance of new players into the Gulf is inevitable.¶ The question of Saudi acquisition of a nuclear deterrent is more relevant than ever when both enemies and friends of the United States are looking at a possible regional drawdown on Washington's part as well as a lack of support for the pro-Western regimes that remain in place. If the U.S. government provides Riyadh with formal security guarantees, it would be natural for it to demand that the kingdom forego its strategic goals. But Riyadh's inclusion under a U.S. defense umbrella is not a given and depends both on **the quality of relations between the two countries** and other Saudi considerations. Riyadh remains skeptical over Washington's willingness to come to its aid and may thus seek to purchase a nuclear deterrent, which would provide it with more freedom vis-à-vis its stronger ally. Under present circumstances, it is not unreasonable for Riyadh to rely on other states for its defense in addition to Washington for the simple reason that it has done so in the past. Likewise, it is more than likely that the Saudis will not act transparently because they have acted in secret previously.¶ After Iran, Saudi Arabia is the **number one candidate for further nuclear proliferation** in the Middle East. Open source evidence remains circumstantial, but perhaps more than any other regional player, Riyadh has the requisite ideological and strategic motives as well as the financial wherewithal to act on the option.¶ The kingdom may conclude that its security constraints as well as the attendant prestige and influence generated by having a bomb outweigh the political and economic costs it will pay. The difficulty in stopping Tehran's dogged quest for a nuclear capability coupled with Riyadh's **doubts about the reliability of Washington** is liable to encourage Riyadh to shorten timetables for developing an independent nuclear infrastructure, as well as to opt to purchase a turnkey nuclear system, an off-the-shelf product, or to enter into a security compact of one sort with another power. Sunni-majority Pakistan has emerged as the natural candidate for such an arrangement.¶ Heavy U.S. pressure is likely to be brought to bear on the Saudis not to acquire nuclear capabilities. Indeed, it seems that, **at present**, the price Riyadh is likely to pay should it acquire military nuclear capabilities might outweigh the advantages of such a move. **But strategic interest**, motivated by considerations of survival, **could have the upper hand**. Should it seem that the kingdom's vital security interests are threatened, it may prefer to take a series of steps, including obtaining a nonconventional arsenal, to reduce risks and ensure the continuity of the House of Saud.

**Saudi prolif causes nuclear war.**

**Edelman ’11** (Eric –Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran>)

\*Yes arms races --

1. Ideology -- Saudi Arabia wants to preserve its stance as the leading Muslim nation.

2. Security -- Middle East countries feel threatened by a nuclear Iran.

Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among **three** or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering **a regional nuclear war**. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

**The plan’s appeasement.**

**Stern 6** (Martin, University of Maryland Graduate, Debunking detente, 11/27/06, http://www.diamondbackonline.com/article\_56223e79-7009-56a3-8afe-5d08bfff6e08.html)

Appeasement is defined as "granting concessions to potential enemies to maintain peace." Giving Iran international legitimacy and removing sanctions would have maintained peace with a potential enemy without changing the undemocratic practices of the enemy. If this isn't appeasement, I don't know how better to define the word.

**That’s not topical – economic engagement is the establishment of economic contacts – not one time appeasement.**

**Resnick 01** – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

**DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN ENGAGEMENT AND APPEASEMENT**

In contrast to many prevailing conceptions of engagement, the one proposed in this essay allows a **substantive distinction** to be drawn between **engagement** and **appeasement**. The standard definition of appeasement--which derives from the language of classical European diplomacy, namely "a policy of attempting to reduce tension between two states by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict between them"(n29)--is venerable but nevertheless inadequate.(n30) It does not provide much guidance to the contemporary policymaker or policy analyst, because it conceives of a foreign policy approach in terms of the **ends** sought while never **making clear** the **precise means** involved. The principal causes of conflict between two states can be removed in a **number of ways**.(n31)

A more refined definition of appeasement that not only remains loyal to the traditional connotations but also establishes a **firm conceptual distinction from engagement** might be: the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state by ceding territory and/or a geopolitical sphere of influence to that state. Indeed, the two best-known cases of appeasement, Great Britain's appeasement of the United States at the turn of the 20th century and of Nazi Germany in the 1930s, reveals that much of this appeasement adopted precisely these guises. The key elements of the British appeasement of the US-acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine-permission for the US to build and fortify a Central American canal, and acquiescence to American claims on the border between Alaska and the Yukon--consisted of explicit acknowledgement of American territorial authority.(n32) Meanwhile, the appeasement of the Third Reich by Great Britain was characterized by acquiescence to: Germany's military reoccupation of the Rhineland (1936); annexation of Austria (1938); acquisition of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia as decided at the Munich Conference; and absorption of the remainder of Czechoslovakia (1939).(n33) A more contemporary example of appeasement is the land for peace exchange that represents the centerpiece of the on-again off-again diplomatic negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority.

Thus, a **rigid conceptual distinction** can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state--engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In addition, **engagement differs from appeasement** by establishing an **increasingly interdependent relationship** between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.(n34) **Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts** or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state.

**Kerry’s focusing on Middle Eastern peace talks -- a shift in his focus causes Israel-Palestine war.**

**YL 11/7,** YaLibnan, Lebanon News Service, 2013, “Kerry warns Israel of Palestinian uprising if peace talks fail,” http://www.yalibnan.com/2013/11/07/kerry-warns-israel-of-palestinian-uprising-if-peace-talks-fail/)//DR. H

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry warned Israel on Thursday that it could face a third Palestinian uprising and deepening international isolation if American-brokered peace negotiations failed.

Both Israel and the Palestinians have given grim assessments of the lack of progress in their talks, which the United States helped revive last July after a three-year hiatus.

Kerry, speaking in Jordan a day after a visit to Israel, where he appealed for limits on its settlement building in the occupied West Bank, reported the negotiations had made “significant progress” in some areas.

He said it was important to keep aiming towards a full “final status” accord tackling issues at the core of the decades-old conflict, in contrast with more modest interim deals plagued by diplomatic deadlock and years of violence.

In an interview with Israel’s Channel 2 television recorded in Jerusalem before he left for Amman, Kerry painted a bleak picture of what might lie ahead if peace is not achieved.

“I mean, does Israel want a third Intifada?” he asked, referring to the danger of a new Palestinian uprising to follow those that erupted in 1987 and 2000.

“If we do not find the way to find peace, there will be an increasing isolation of Israel, there will be an increasing campaign of delegitimization of Israel that has been taking place on an international basis.”

Kerry was due to meet Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Amman later on Thursday before returning to Jerusalem for more talks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Friday.

“Both Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas reaffirmed their commitment to these negotiations despite the fact that at moments there are obviously tensions,” Kerry said.

Friction over the talks has risen in the last week because of Israeli plans, announced in tandem with its release of 26 Palestinian prisoners, for some 3,500 new homes for Jewish settlers in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Palestinians have warned of a crisis if Israel continues to insist that they effectively agreed to turn a blind eye to the settlement expansion, in exchange for the progressive release of 104 long-serving inmates.

After meeting Abbas on Wednesday in the West Bank city of Bethlehem, Kerry said Palestinians had never condoned settlements, which they and many countries view as illegal and the United States terms illegitimate.

Palestinians fear the enclaves, built on land Israel captured in the 1967 Middle East war and which they seek for a future state, will deny them a viable country. Israel cites biblical and historical links to the territory.

Kerry, whose shuttle diplomacy helped to revive the talks, has set a nine-month schedule for an agreement, despite widespread skepticism.

“I remain absolutely committed to this ability to get a final status (agreement),” Kerry said at a news conference in Amman, repeatedly warning of “prolonged, continued conflict”, violence and confrontation if the talks failed.

**Plan shifts Kerry’s focus.**

**Anderson and Grewell 2k,** (Terry L., Executive Director of the Property and Environment Research Center, J. Bishop, former research associate for PERC. He is a graduate of Stanford University, the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, and Northwestern Law School, “The Greening of Foreign Policy”, PERC Policy Series: PS-20, December 2000, <http://www.perc.org/pdf/ps20.pdf>)

Greater international environmental regulation can increase international tension. Foreign policy is a bag of goods that includes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs it down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues. Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of violence such as the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources necessary to deal with traditional international issues. As Schaefer (2000, 46) writes, “Because diplomatic currency is finite . . . it is critically important that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount importance to the nation. Traditionally, these priorities have been opposing hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing vital resources,

**Israel-Palestine war causes extinction -- risk of war is high.**

**Beres 11/11,** Louis, 2013, “The Future of Israel's Nuclear Deterrence: Debates about Iran and Palestinian statehood will have an effect on Israel's mode of self-defense,” http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/11/11/iran-israel-and-the-nuclear-threat-in-the-middle-east)//DR. H

A Palestinian state would make Israel's conventional capabilities more problematic; it could thereby heighten the chances of **a regional nuclear war**. Although Palestine itself would obviously be non-nuclear, its overall strategic impact could nonetheless be magnified by continuously unfolding and more-or-less unpredictable developments in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Lebanon and elsewhere in this roiling and chaotic area.

A nuclear war could arrive in Israel not only as a "bolt-from-the-blue" surprise missile attack, but also as a result, intended or inadvertent, of escalation. If certain already extant enemy states were to begin conventional or biological attacks upon Israel, Jerusalem might respond, sooner or later, with aptly "proportionate" nuclear reprisals. Or, if these enemy states were to begin their aggressions with conventional attacks upon Israel, Jerusalem's own conventional reprisals might be met, in the future, with enemy nuclear counterstrikes.

For now, this would become possible only if a still-nuclearizing Iran were spared any final forms of Israeli or American preemptive interference, actions appropriately identifiable in law as "anticipatory self-defense." As a preemptive attack against Iran now seems operationally implausible, it is reasonable to assume that a persuasive Israeli conventional deterrent, at least to the extent that it would prevent enemy conventional and/or biological attacks in the first place, could reduce Israel's escalatory exposure to a nuclear war.

Pertinent questions arise. With its implicit ("deliberately ambiguous") nuclear capacities, why should Israel need a conventional deterrent at all? After all, even after Palestinian statehood, wouldn’t all rational enemy states desist from launching any conventional or biological attacks upon Israel out of an entirely sensible fear of Israeli nuclear retaliation?

Not necessarily. Aware that Israel would cross the nuclear threshold only in very extraordinary circumstances, these enemy states could be convinced – rightly or wrongly – that as long as their attacks remained recognizably non-nuclear, Israel would always respond in kind.

The only credible way for Israel to deter large-scale conventional attacks after the creation of Palestine would be by maintaining visible and large-scale conventional capabilities. Of course, enemy states contemplating any first-strike attacks using chemical or biological weapons are apt to take more seriously Israel's nuclear deterrent, whether newly-disclosed, or still "in the basement." A strong conventional capability is needed by Israel essentially to deter or to preempt conventional attacks, attacks that could, if they were undertaken, lead quickly via escalation to various forms of unconventional war.

However unforeseen, Palestine, already a "nonmember observer state" at the United Nations, would have measurably corrosive effects on power and peace in the Middle East. As, by definition, the creation of this particular Arab state would come at the territorial expense of Israel, the Jewish state's strategic depth would promptly and irretrievably diminish. Over time, Israel's conventional capacity to ward off enemy attacks could be commensurately reduced.

If certain enemy states were to perceive Israel's own sense of expanding weakness and possible desperation, this could imply a strengthening of Israel's nuclear deterrent. If, however, front-line enemy states did not perceive such an enhancement among Israel's decision-makers, these states, animated by Israel's conventional force deterioration, could be encouraged to attack. Paradoxically, for Israel, even the "successful" defeat of Arab/Islamic state enemies in an unconventional war could prove intolerable. Here, after all, the results of a nuclear war, or perhaps even a chemical or biological war, could prove calamitous for the "winner," as well as the "loser."

To be sure, a meaningful risk of regional nuclear war in the Middle East exists independently of any Palestinian state. Still, this unprecedented risk would be further enlarged if a 23rd Arab state were to appear more-or-less simultaneously with Iranian nuclear weapons. Above anything else, Israel must now do what is needed to prevent such coinciding and mutually-reinforcing and **existential perils.**

**Text: The United States federal government should normalize its trade relations with Cuba if and only if the governments of a majority of Latin American nations commit to:**

**--actively seeking a normalization process between the United States and Cuba, and**

**--compelling the Cuban government to work towards establishing representative democracy and better respect for human rights.**

**Counterplan solves the case—Latin American governments will say yes**

**Castañeda 9** - Jorge G. Castañeda, professor at New York University and fellow at the New America Foundation, was Mexico’s foreign minister from 2000 to 2003, April 21, 2009, Wall Street Journal, "The Right Deal on Cuba," proquest)

The question of what to do about the embargo has once again cornered an American president. If President Barack Obama lifts the embargo unilaterally, he will send a message to the Castros and the rest of Latin America that human rights and democracy are not his bailiwick. Furthermore, he lacks the votes in the Senate to do so, unless he obtains an explicit Cuban quid pro quo, which Raul Castro cannot grant him, especially with his brother back in charge.

Conversely, if Mr. Obama limits change to the recently announced freer flow of remittances and family visits to the island, Democrats in the House, Latin American leaders, and the Castros will remain unsatisfied. And if he insists on political change as a precondition for lifting the embargo, Mr. Obama would be pursuing the policy that his last 10 predecessors have fruitlessly followed.

There might be a way to square the circle. It begins with a unilateral end to the embargo: Nothing is expected from Cuba. But in exchange for eliminating the embargo, key Latin American players would be expected to commit to actively seeking a normalization process between Washington and Havana, and to forcing Cuba to establish representative democracy and respect for human rights.

As democrats who experienced authoritarian rule and sought international support in their struggle against it, leaders like Brazilian President Lula da Silva, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet, and Mexican President Felipe Calderon have been incredibly cynical and irresponsible about Cuba. Mr. Calderon and Ms. Bachelet have forsaken their commitment to democracy and human rights in order to accommodate the left wing. Mr. da Silva, despite having been jailed by the military dictatorship in the early 1980s, has pursued the traditional Brazilian policy of avoiding controversy. By nudging the Latin leaders toward a principled stance, Mr. Obama would turn the tables.

This policy would give the Cubans what they say they want: an unconditional end to the embargo, the beginning of a negotiation process, and perhaps even access to international financial institutions' funds. The Latin American leaders would get a major concession from the new administration on a highly symbolic issue. And human-rights defenders in Latin America and elsewhere would see their concerns regarding free elections, freedom of the press, freedom of association, and the liberation of political prisoners addressed as a demand from Cuba's friends -- not as an imposition from Washington.

Mr. Obama would look great, since U.S. policy would shift in exchange for Latin leaders' dedication to principles like democracy and human rights that he and they espouse. A clear commitment from Latin leaders to a normalization that would not follow the Vietnamese course (economic reform with no political change) would be a major foreign policy victory for Mr. Obama.

**Unilaterally cooperating with Cuba destroys Latin American democracy.**

**Castañeda 8** - Jorge G. Castañeda, professor at New York University and fellow at the New America Foundation, was Mexico~’s foreign minister from 2000 to 2003, September-October 2008, "Morning in Latin America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5, proquest)

Realpolitik and fear of another exodus of Cuban refugees across the Straits of Florida may tempt Washington to pursue a "Chinese," or "Vietnamese," solution to the relationship with Cuba: that is, normalizing diplomatic relations in exchange for economic reforms while leaving the question of internal political change until much later. It should not do this, chiefly because of the regional implications. Over the past few decades, the United States, Canada, the European Union, and Latin America have patiently constructed a regional legal framework to defend and encourage democratic rule as well as respect for human rights in the hemisphere. These values have been enshrined in conventions, charters, and free trade-agreements, from the InterAmerican Democratic Charter, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the American Convention on Human Rights and the labor and environmental chapters of free-trade agreements, as well as in the democratic clauses of the economic agreements between Chile and the EU and between Mexico and the EU. These mechanisms are not perfect, and they have not truly been tested. But to waive them in the interests of simply guaranteeing stability in Cuba and ensuring an exodus-free succession instead of a democratic transition-that is, creating once again a "Cuban exception" for reasons of pure pragmatism-would be unworthy of the enormous efforts every country in the hemisphere has made to deepen and strengthen democracy in the Americas. Cuba must return to the regional concert of powers, but accepting this concert s rules. To allow it to proceed otherwise would weaken democracy and encourage authoritarian traditions in the hemisphere-and lay the groundwork for other exceptions that would justify their existence by invoking the Cuban precedent.

**That causes a global collapse.**

**Fauriol and Weintraub 95** – \*director of the CSIS Americas program and \*\*Prof of Public Affairs at the University of Texas Georges and Sidney, The Washington Quarterly, "U.S. Policy, Brazil, and the Southern Cone", Lexis

The democracy theme also carries much force in the hemisphere today. The State Department regularly parades the fact that all countries in the hemisphere, save one, now have democratically elected governments. True enough, as long as the definition of democracy is flexible, but these countries turned to democracy mostly of their own volition. It is hard to determine if the United States is using the democracy theme as a club in the hemisphere (hold elections or be excluded) or promoting it as a goal. If as a club, its efficacy is limited to this hemisphere, as the 1994 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Indonesia demonstrated in its call for free trade in that region, replete with nondemocratic nations, by 2020. Following that meeting, Latin Americans are somewhat cynical as to whether the United States really cares deeply about promoting democracy if this conflicts with expanding exports. Yet this triad of objectives -- economic liberalization and free trade, democratization, and sustainable development/ alleviation of poverty -- is generally accepted in the hemisphere. The commitment to the latter two varies by country, but all three are taken as valid. All three are also themes expounded widely by the United States, but with more vigor in this hemisphere than anywhere else in the developing world. Thus, failure to advance on all three in Latin America will **compromise progress elsewhere in the world**.

**Extinction.**

**Diamond 1995** - Hoover Institute Senior Fellow (Larry, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,” http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The **very source of life on Earth**, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. **Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy**, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

**The aff creates a perfect world that they order themselves to – this engenders hate for the real world, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.**

Paul **Saurette**, PhD in political theory at John Hopkins U, **in 96** "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them': Nietzshce, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in INternational Relations Theory." Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25 no. 1 page 3-6

The Will to Order and Politics-as-Making The Philosophical Foundation of the Will to Truth/Order •. I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. A will to a system is a lack .of ! integrity."

According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to , meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.5 Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, .therefore, that to understand the development of our modem conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and k competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and .affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence.6 However, this •incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. -Everywhere the : instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were.but five steps from excess: the monstrum-in-animo was a universal danger’. No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end—And Socrates understood that the world had need of him —his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation. Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, '[rationality was divined as a saviour...it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....'9 Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a 'Real World\* of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and^ ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern'10 understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition *ressentiment*. and argues that it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche,' ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World, As Nietzsche wrote, ‘I suffer: someone must be to blame for it’ thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: ‘Quite so my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,-you alone are to blame for yourself '-This is brazen and.false enough: but one thing, is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered." Faced, with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational.... '12 The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdiuin the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the .Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest. sleep, in short absence of suffering According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral-Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this," however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established creating an ever-increasing Will-to Truth. This self-perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests, [t]he ascetic ideal has a goal—this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.''1 The very structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True, and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes .the fundamental philosophical principle of modernity.

**Only doing nothing in the instance of the plan promotes real peace and prevents inevitable extinction.**

**Nietzsche, ‘78** The anti-christ *Human, All too Human.* Aphorism #284 1878

*The means to real peace*.— No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. And perhaps the great day will come when people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, "We break the sword," and will smash its entire military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed, out of a height of feeling—that is the means to real peace, which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one's neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared—this must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a "gradual decrease of the military burden." Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloud—and from up high.

**No food wars, and they don’t escalate.**

**Salehyan 08** (Idean, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ North Texas, Journal of Peace Research, “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet”, 45:3, Sage, DOI: 10.1177/0022343308088812)

A few caveats are in order here. It is important to note, again, that the most severe effects of climate change are likely to be felt in the future, and the future is inherently uncertain.4 While fundamental shifts in the environment are not inconceivable, our best bet for predicting what is to come is to look at what has transpired in the past. Since it is frequently argued that climate change will lead to resource scarcities and exacerbate inequality, it is possible to draw upon past evidence regarding these factors to develop a sense of how conflicts might unfold given changes in the Earth’s atmosphere. Additionally, I do not take issue with the claim that climate change will present considerable challenges for human societies and ecosystems more generally. Humanitarian crises stemming, in part, from climate change have the potential to be severe, and steps must be taken quickly to attenuate such contingencies. Rather, my purpose here is to underscore the point that environmental processes, by themselves, cannot explain why, where, and when fighting will occur; rather, the interaction between environmental and political systems is critical for understanding organized armed violence. First, the deterministic view has poor predictive power as to where and when conflicts will break out. For every potential example of an environmental catastrophe or resource shortfall that leads to violence, there are many more counter-examples in which conflict never occurs. But popular accounts typically do not look at the dogs that do not bark. Darfur is frequently cited as a case where desertification led to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and ethnic cleansing.5 Yet, food scarcity and hunger are problems endemic to many countries – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – but similar problems elsewhere have not led to large-scale violence. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, food shortages and malnutrition affect more than a third of the population in Malawi, Zambia, the Comoros, North Korea, and Tanzania,6 although none of these countries have experienced fullblown civil war and state failure. Hurricanes, coastal flooding, and droughts – which are all likely to intensify as the climate warms – are frequent occurrences which rarely lead to violence. The Asian Tsunami of 2004, although caused by an oceanic earthquake, led to severe loss of life and property, flooding, population displacement, and resource scarcity, but it did not trigger new wars in Southeast Asia. Large-scale migration has the potential to provoke conflict in receiving areas (see Reuveny, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), yet most migration flows do not lead to conflict, and, in this regard, social integration and citizenship policies are particularly important (Gleditsch, Nordås & Salehyan, 2007). In short, resource scarcity, natural disasters, and long-term climatic shifts are ubiquitous, while armed conflict is rare; therefore, environmental conditions, by themselves, cannot predict violent outbreaks. Second, even if local skirmishes over access to resources arise, these do not always escalate to open warfare and state collapse. While interpersonal violence is more or less common and may intensify under resource pressures, sustained armed conflict on a massive scale is difficult to conduct. Meier, Bond & Bond (2007) show that, under certain circumstances, environmental conditions have led to cattle raiding among pastoralists in East Africa, but these conflicts rarely escalate to sustained violence. Martin (2005) presents evidence from Ethiopia that, while a large refugee influx and population pressures led to localized conflict over natural resources, effective resource management regimes were able to ameliorate these tensions. Both of these studies emphasize the role of local dispute-resolution regimes and institutions – not just the response of central governments – in preventing resource conflicts from spinning out of control. Martin’s analysis also points to the importance of international organizations, notably the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in implementing effective policies governing refugee camps. Therefore, local hostilities need not escalate to serious armed conflict and can be managed if there is the political will to do so.

**Can’t solve Cuban sugar ethanol.**

**Sanchez ‘11**

Adriana E. Sanchez, NotiEn, News Agency, 2011, “Biofuels Fighting for Space in Central America and Cuba,” http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/12797/Biofuels%20Fighting%20for%20Space%20in%20Central%20America%20and%20Cuba.pdf?sequence=1

Similar to Central America, Cuba’s potential to become a leader in biofuel production is subject to speculation, and it will be strongly tied to the energy policy that the island adopts within the next few years. The Association for the Study of Cuban Economy (ASCE) says sugarcane could seemingly provide the raw material for biofuel production. But tight supplies might be a problem. The island nation is expected to produce only 1.2 million tons of raw sugar. This is a very small amount when compared to sugar production in the 1990s, which was estimated to reach 7 million to 8 million tons per year. With its current sugarcane output, Cuba could produce an estimated 3.2 billion gallons of ethanol per year, energy industry sources say. ¶ In an interview with NotiEn, Jorge Piñón, a well-known expert on Cuban energy policy, suggested that Cuba would have to stop its dependence on fossil fuels from foreign countries if it is to develop energy independence. "Cuba passed from papa Russia to papa Venezuela to solve its population’s energy demand," said Piñón. "Cuba must strive to start working on an energy policy that can help the country independent of who is in power." ¶ Piñón said ethanol production has not been more actively promoted because of the complicated relation that Cuba has had with sugarcane. "Fidel Castro puts his foot down every time there are talks about an increase in ethanol production; for him it is a political issue," said Piñón, a visiting research fellow at the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center and an analyst for the Center for Hemispheric Policy at the University of Miami.

**Lifting the embargo causes US sugar price distortions.**

**Miami Herald 02** (6/26/02, “Cuba embargo under fire - Sally Grooms Cowal's Group cites benefits for U.S.,” http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/706185/posts)//DR. H

In addition, what would happen abroad to Brazil’s sugar market, one of the largest producers of sugar, (even if a significant amount of that country's sugar is used to produce ethanol)? and to the Dominican Republic’s or Mexico's market? to mention only three sugar producing countries in our hemisphere. We should ponder, in this context, the following statement issued on August 10, 2000 by Joseph Terrell, Director of Public Affairs of the American Sugar Alliance: "We are well aware of the challenges lifting the Cuban embargo could have on the US sugar industry. Also, quota holders in other countries are monitoring the situation closely as well because they could stand to lose…we are monitoring this closely." A similar view has been advanced by the general manager of the Louisiana Sugar Cane Cooperative and secretary/treasurer of the Louisiana Farm Bureau Foundation, Jackie Theriot, who said: **Lifting the embargo -- without holding Cuba to production limits -- would flood the U.S. market with sugar, dropping the prices** and bankrupting the domestic industry. (quoted by Kevin Blanchard in his article "Now no Time to Help Cuba," The Advocate ONLINE (April 11, 2002) However, it is unlikely that Castro's Cuba would accept being hamstrung by production limits and it would go against the free trade ideology espoused by Washington these days.

Is the U.S. going to harden the grip of Castro by granting him even a significantly diminished market opening at the expense of its own sugar industry? Imperil the Brazilian sale of sugar to the U.S. just to please Castro? Is the U.S. going to finance the the conversion of Cuban sugar into ethanol, as means to reduce the worldwide glut of sugar even though the prospects of creating a large U.S. ethanol market is still an economic entelechy? Moreover, consider that during one year, in the decade of the 50’s (1959, for example) Cuba’s sugar quota in the U.S. totaled 1.256 million metric tons, roughly the same amount that the U.S. now imports from 40 countries! It is well known that when Cuba lost its generous American sugar quota in the 60’s this amount was allocated to other countries. which used the allocation to maintain their sugar industry and increase their production. What would be the ripple effect of the Cuban re-intervention in the American sugar market, given that it will be considerably less than what it sold in the 50’s and will offer sugar at a low price to gain a foothold in the market? This macroeconomic assessment has not been addressed in the public arena by Castro’s acolytes and foot soldiers in this country. In addition, in the case Dominican Republic, the European Union subsidized exports have already caused a 20% income loss of income in that country. If Cuba’s sales of sugar take a slice of the American market, both the domestic and international suppliers, such as the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Mexico (who incidentally, has been encouraged to develop an ethanol industry) are going to feel even more severely impacted. Even if Cuba did not make efforts to create a capital intensive industry, as the cane sugar producers in the U.S and producers of sugar in the world have done it, Cuban sugar would be produced more cheaply, as already indicated, doubtlessly, with Communist government subsidies in order to retain a share of the American market.

**Multilat fails and is unsustainable.**

**Young et al 13** Kevin Young is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, David Held is Master of University College, and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham. He is also Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy, Thomas Hale is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, Open Democracy, May 24, 2013, "Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation", http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hale-david-held-kevin-young/gridlock-growing-breakdown-of-global-cooperation

\*We do not endorse the ableist language.

The Doha round of trade negotiations is **deadlocked**, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met **for two decades without** finding **a way to stem** global **emissions. The UN is ~~paralyzed~~** in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. **Global coop**eration **is gridlocked** across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are **not the result of any single** underlying causal **structure**, but rather of **several** underlying **dynamics** that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems – indeed it is – but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that **have overwhelmed** the **problem-solving capacities** of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of ‘governed globalization’ that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of institutional arrangements have emerged alongside formal intergovernmental bodies, including a variety of types of transnational governance arrangements such as networks of government officials, public-private partnerships, as well as exclusively private/corporate bodies. Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O’Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. Yet **the “supply”** side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, **has stalled.** In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, **multilateral** and transnational **coop**eration **is** now increasingly **ineffective** or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify **four reasons** for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising **multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation**. Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms. Each of these are explained briefly below.

**Growing multipolarity**.

The absolute number of states has **increased by 300 percent** in the last 70 years, meaning that the most basic transaction costs of global governance have grown. More importantly, the number of states that “matter” on a given issue—that is, the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be adequately addressed—has expanded by similar proportions. At Bretton Woods in 1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the United States with some consultation with the UK and other European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the principal forum for global economic management, not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not solve the problem on their own. However, a consequence of this progress is now that many **more countries, represent**ing a **diverse** range of **interests, must agree** in order for global cooperation to occur.

**Institutional inertia**.

The postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the Bretton Woods institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that were wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As power shifts from West to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with effectively. At the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some countries should hold more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally bankrupt. And **yet, the architects of the postwar order did not**, in most cases, **design institutions that would** organically **adjust to fluctuations in** national **power**.

**Harder problems**.

As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must cooperate has evolved. **Problems are both now more extensive**, implicating a broader range of countries and individuals within countries, **and intensive**, penetrating deep into the domestic policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era, trade negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between industrialized countries. Now, however, negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property, health and environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards—about which countries often disagree sharply. In the area of environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete actions from a small number of top polluters. By contrast, the threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it involve nearly all countries of the globe. Yet, **the divergence of** voice and **interest** within both the developed and developing worlds, along with the sheer complexity of the incentives needed to achieve a low carbon economy, have **made a global deal**, thus far, **impossible** (Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011).

**Fragmentation**.

The institution-builders of the 1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in a dense institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency. The exponential **rise in** both multilateral and transnational **organizations** has **creat**ed a more **complex** multilevel and multi-actor system of **global governance.** Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to intense competition. In this context, the proliferation of institutions tends to lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide policy (Keohane and Martin 1995), which can help define the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. **Fragmented institutions**, in turn, **disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs.** In stressing four pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which contemporary global governance problems build up on each other, although different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. The **challenges now faced by the multilateral order are substantially different from those faced** by the 1945 victors **in the postwar settlement**. They are second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. Together, they now block and inhibit problem solving and reform at the global level.

**Engagement with Cuba wrecks US credibility.**

**Rubin ‘11 -** Labor Law Attorney and Washington Post Journalist, quotes the chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, quotes a report by the Associated Press, quotes the former deputy national security advisor, (Jennifer, August 18, 2011, “Obama’s Cuba appeasement”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL\_blog.html )//HH

The chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was equally irate: “According to news reports, the Administration attempted to barter for the freedom of wrongly imprisoned U.S. citizen Alan Gross by offering to return Rene Gonzalez, a convicted Cuban spy who was involved in the murder of innocent American citizens. If true, such a swap would demonstrate the outrageous willingness of the Administration to engage with the regime in Havana, which is designated by the U.S. as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Regrettably, this comes as no surprise as this Administration has never met a dictatorship with which it didn’t try to engage. It seems that a rogue regime cannot undertake a deed so dastardly that the Obama Administration would abandon engagement, even while talking tough with reporters. **Cuba is a state-sponsor of terrorism. We should not be trying to barter with them.** We must demand the unconditional release of Gross, not engage in a quid-pro-quo with tyrants.”

As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the administration actions didn’t stop there. The [Associated Press](http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-10-14/cuba-imprisoned-american-swap/50767012/1?csp=34news)reported, “The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, as well as by senior U.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross’ release. He also told Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of interest to Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; reducing spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs like the one that led to the hiring of Gross; authorizing U.S. companies to help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling; improving postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for Cuban medical personnel to move to the United States; and licensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United States.”

Former deputy national security adviser [Elliott Abrams explained](http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2011/10/14/trading-away-cuba-policy/#more-2032), “It is especially offensive that we were willing to negotiate over support for democracy in Cuba, for that would mean that the unjust imprisonment of Gross had given the Castro dictatorship a significant victory. The implications for those engaged in similar democracy promotion activities elsewhere are clear: local regimes would think that imprisoning an American might be a terrific way to get into a negotiation about ending such activities. Every American administration faces tough choices in these situations, but the Obama administration has made a great mistake here. Our support for democracy should not be a subject of negotiation with the Castro regime.”

The administration’s conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Gross’s imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same.

Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots’ behavior has worsened. **There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States.**

Whether it is Cuba or [Iran,](http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/280214/iran-dangerous-and-diplomacy-has-failed-jamie-m-fly) the administration reverts to “engagement” mode when its engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? We’ll sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? We’ll trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? We’ll put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administration’s willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.

**Single issues aren’t key to cred.**

**Lake, 10–** Professor of Social Sciences, distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego (David A., “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the Rehabilitation of US authority”, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeMakingAmericaSafe.pdf)//DR. H

President Obama and his administration appear to recognize the need to bolster the authority and legitimacy of the United States in the world. But virtue alone cannot provide credible guarantees against future US opportunism. Unipolarity is an enabling condition that persists. **The problem of credibility is structural, and not one that a new administration can solve simply by a new style or approach to foreign policy.** Ironically, to safeguard its authority requires that the United States embed its coercive capabilities even deeper into multilateral institutions that can provide real checks on potential opportunism.

**Plan kills Latin American relations.**

**Suchlicki 2k.** (Jaime, University of Miami, s Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History ¶ and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban ¶ and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. June “The U.S. Embargo of Cuba” http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf)

**Cuba is not an important issue in U.S.-Latin American relations**. The U.S.-Latin American agenda includes as priority items trade, investment, and transfer of technology, migration, drugs, environment, and intellectual property rights. **Cuba is not a priority item on this agenda**. While publicly many Latin American countries oppose the embargo, privately they are extremely concerned that Cuba will divert investments from their countries to the island, and particularly that tourism will flock to Cuba, to the detriment of the Caribbean economies.

**No impact to China rise.**

**Rosecrance et al 10** – (Richard, Political Science Professor @ Cal and Senior Fellow @ Harvard’s Belfer Center and Former Director @ Burkle Center of IR @ UCLA, and Jia Qingguo, PhD Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of School of International Studies @ Peking University, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict?” Global Asia 4.4, http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251)

Will China and the US Go to War? If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is “no,” or at least not likely. Why? First, despite its revolutionary past, China has gradually accepted the US-led world order and become a status quo power. It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it. Second, China has clearly rejected the option of territorial expansion. It argues that territorial expansion is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because it does not advance one’s interests. China’s behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, it has been trying to settle its border disputes through negotiation. Through persistent efforts, China has concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, even on the question of Taiwan, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, it has adopted a policy of peaceful reunification. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist. Third, China has relied on trade and investment for national welfare and prestige, instead of military conquest. And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that it really sees no other option than to continue on this path to prosperity. Finally, after years of reforms, China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these are good values that it should strive to realize in practice. A Different World It is also important to note that certain changes in international relations since the end of World War II have made the peaceful rise of a great power more likely. To begin with, the emergence of nuclear weapons has drastically reduced the usefulness of war as a way to settle great power rivalry. By now, all great powers either have nuclear weapons or are under a nuclear umbrella. If the objective of great power rivalry is to enhance one’s interests or prestige, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that these goals can no longer be achieved through military confrontation. Under these circumstances, countries have to find other ways to accommodate each other — something that China and the US have been doing and are likely to continue to do. Also, globalization has made it easier for great powers to increase their national welfare and prestige through international trade and investment rather than territorial expansion. In conducting its foreign relations, the US relied more on trade and investment than territorial expansion during its rise, while Japan and Germany relied almost exclusively on international trade and investment. China, too, has found that its interests are best served by adopting the same approach. Finally, the development of relative pacifism in the industrialized world, and indeed throughout the world since World War II, has discouraged any country from engaging in territorial expansion. There is less and less popular support for using force to address even legitimate concerns on the part of nation states. Against this background, efforts to engage in territorial expansion are likely to rally international resistance and condemnation. Given all this, is the rise of China likely to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no.

**plan reinvigorates pink tide..**

**Sadowski ‘11**

Richard Sadowski is a Class of 2012 J.D. candidate, at Hofstra University¶ School of Law, NY. Mr. Sadowski is also the Managing Editor of Production of¶ the Journal of International Business and Law Vol. XI. “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and¶ Prevention within the Framework of the United¶ States’ Embargo” – ¶ Sustainable Development Law & Policy¶ Volume 12; Issue 1 Fall 2011: Natural Resource Conflicts Article 10 – http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp

Since its inception, the Cuban embargo has ebbed and¶ flowed in severity and support. While the measure seems to be¶ increasingly unpopular, it takes legitimate aim at a Cuban regime¶ characterized by intolerance and oppression. Though the Castros¶ utilize the embargo as a scapegoat upon which to blame Cuba’s¶ failures,94 **recent changes** suggest the embargo is indeed **close to¶ accomplishing its goals.**95 Despite this, critics, including U.S. oil¶ producers, want the embargo dropped.¶ Regardless of criticism**, the embargo must remain in place¶ until its goals are met**. Environmental fears can be effectively¶ countered through bilateral response and preparation agreements¶ with Cuba. Also, economic and energy needs are more¶ properly addressed through drilling U.S. resources. Ultimately,¶ with the aid of legislation such as Buchanan’s bill, the United¶ States should exercise its political and economic power to pressure¶ foreign companies to avoid offshore drilling in Cuba. The¶ United States can dissuade foreign investment without compromising¶ the embargo. It appears **an end to oppressive communist¶ rule in Cuba is nearing**. Now is the time for the United States to¶ both reject offshore drilling in Cuba and demonstrate resolve in¶ meeting the goals of the economic embargo.

**That causes Russia war – miscalc.**

**Walser ‘8**

(Ray Walser, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation – Chávez, Venezuela, and Russia: A New Cuban Missile Crisis? – WebMemo #2064 -- September 15th http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/wm2064.cfm)

Like his iconic mentor, Fidel Castro, Chávez thrives on mounting tensions and confrontation with the U.S. It is through confrontation that he attains political identity and larger-than-merited international standing. Like Fidel Castro, Chávez aspires to build and lead an anti-U.S., anti-Western coalition. **Unlike Castro**, however, **Chávez is in possession of significant petro**leum **power** and has varied sources of international support. There is danger that Chávez, like Castro, will invite Russia to serve as a guarantor of Venezuela's security **and subsequently draw Russia**, either willingly or unwillingly, **into additional confrontations with the U.S.** A

**Miscalc goes nuclear.**

**Gottemoeller ‘8**

(Rose Gottemoeller was sworn in as the United States Department of State's Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance on April 6, 2009. She was the chief negotiator of the follow on for the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty otherwise known as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation. Since 2000, she had been with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – “U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Iran: Aftermath of the Summer War in Georgia,” Carnegie Moscow Center, August- July 2008. PLESE NOTE – THIS CARD APPEARS IN A HOST OF CURRENT OPEN-SOURCE DEBATE DOCS AND THE URL THAT APPEARS ON THOSE CARDS MISDIRECTS TO A DIFFERENT Gottemoeller ARTICLE. The website below redirects to her October article: http://www.scribd.com/doc/13031239/RussianAmerican-Security-Relations-After-Georgia)

No holds barred, no rules—the United States and Russia may be heading to a confrontation

# 2NC

**6. Accidents result in extinction**.

**Toon ‘7** (Owen B, chair – Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences – Colorado University, climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

**Saudi Arabia fears the narrative that the US may abandon them for North American supplies.**

**Rogers 3/20**

[2013 – Will Rogers is the Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). At CNAS, Mr. Rogers’ research focus is on science, technology and national security policy. He has authored or co-authored a range of publications on energy, climate change, environmental cooperation in Asia and cybersecurity, “America Committed to Gulf Security Despite Changing Relationship with Region's Oil, says Gen. Dempsey,” Center for New American Security, 2013, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2013/03/america-committed-gulf-security-despite-changing-relationship-regions-]

America’s relationship with the Middle East’s energy resources is changing as U.S. domestic oil production continues to grow. A combination of hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling and advanced seismic technologies have contributed to the largest annual growth in U.S. crude oil production since Colonel Edwin Drake first drilled for oil in Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859. Most of the crude oil is coming from shale formations in North Dakota and Texas – what we call “light tight oil.” Since 2010, the United States has, on average, increased monthly crude oil production by 50,000 barrels a day.¶ Not all of this U.S. light tight oil is displacing Middle East crude, of course. A number of factors matter, most importantly the crude oil grade. The United States is producing light tight oil, that is, **low-density crude oil**, whereas the United States imports heavier crudes from the Persian Gulf, including from **Saudi Arabia**. Moreover, U.S. refineries have been increasingly geared to absorb heavier crudes, from the Persian Gulf, but more so from Canada, Mexico and Venezuela.¶ Nevertheless, the glut in U.S. crude oil production and declining demand for oil (a consequence of slow economic growth and more fuel efficient vehicles) have contributed to a powerful notion that the United States is relying less and less on oil from the Persian Gulf and could conceivably help wean America off crude oil imports from the Middle East entirely (a debatable point).¶ Whether or not one believes that the United States can break the tether to Middle East oil, U.S. allies and **partners in the Persian Gulf are increasingly nervous about America’s long-term security commitment to the region**. After all, **if the U**nited **S**tates **no longer relies on energy from the region,** why should American foot the bill for protecting the sea lanes – that backbone of the crude oil trade in the region – **or so the narrative goes**.¶ The United States has a number of stakes in stability of the Persian Gulf oil trade even if it does rely less on oil from the region. Supply shocks will contribute to higher global oil prices, which will be felt at home. Moreover, supply shocks are damaging to our allies, particularly those in East Asia that have grown more dependent on oil and gas from the Middle East and North Africa. But there are other legitimate security concerns as well, which were not far from General Martin Dempsey’s mind when he responded to a question on Monday about how the American energy revolution will impact U.S. interests and presence in the Persian Gulf. Here’s what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said:If by 2017 the United States can achieve some level of energy independence, why in the world would we continue to be concerned about the energy that flows out of – out of the Gulf? Well, look, my answer to that is I didn’t go to the Gulf in 1991 and stay there for about the next 20 years because of oil. That’s not why I went. It’s not why my children went. It’s –and we went there because we thought that a region of the world where we had – where we had not, except for a few bilateral relationships – where we hadn’t invested much of our, let’s call it, bandwidth, intellectual energy, commitment – now, we went there in ’91 because of the – of the aggression of Saddam Hussein, but we stayed there because I think we came to the realization that the future of the region was tied to our future, and not through this thing called oil but rather through the – as I said earlier, the shared interest in a common future where people would be able to build a better life and where threats could be managed collaboratively, not by the United States uniquely but by the relationships we would build on the basis of common interests. So when I hear about in 2017, you know, oil won’t be as big a factor for us – and that’s great. I hope we do achieve energy independence. But I can assure you that at least from a military perspective – and I can only speak, as I dress, from the military perspective – that the continued development of capabilities – military capabilities, notably, in my world, but also partnerships and trust that we build by working together, by exchanging officers and noncommissioned officers in our professional military schools, that on that basis, you will find –you will find that the future will be a period of greater commitment.¶ Now, you know, if you measure our commitment in terms of numbers of boots on the ground and numbers of aircraft and number of aircraft carriers, I think you’ll probably –you know, there’ll always be this debate about inclining or declining commitment. But that’s not what the commitment’s all about, really, in my view. As I said, I went to – I went to the Gulf in ’91, spent almost the next 20 years there on and off and didn’t do it for oil.¶ So we have two powerful strategic cross-currents that the Obama administration will have to confront in the near term.¶ This week marks the anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a solemn reminder for some that the United States should be less engaged in the Middle East, not more. Add this to the notion that the United States could break the tether to Middle East oil, **and the** domestic **narrative speaks for itself**. At the same time, though, a credible U.S. security commitment to our partners in the Persian Gulf may be the only way to allay concerns about security challenges in the region. Take for example, Iran. My colleagues Colin Kahl, Melissa Dalton and Matt Irvine recently published a report assessing the possibility that an Iranian bomb could lead to Saudi Arabia developing the bomb – Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia be Next? Kahl, Dalton and Irvine argue quite persuasively that a number of factors will keep Saudi Arabia from developing the bomb. But one of the big caveats to this is a credible U.S. security commitment to Saudi Arabia. Does the Royal Family in Riyadh feel comfortable about this commitment given the competing narrative that America may have an opportunity to walk away from the Persian Gulf if it doesn’t need access to the region’s oil? The public **perception on these issues - at home and abroad - will have to be managed carefully. What a tightrope to walk.**

**US *would*** **sacrifice oil contracts from the Mid-East in exchange for Cuba** – ***saves on transport costs***

**Fesler 09**

[Lily Fesler, Research Associate, “Cuban Oil: Havana’s Potential Geo-Political Bombshell,” June 11, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, http://www.coha.org/cuban-oil-havana%E2%80%99s-potential-geo-political-bombshell/#sthash.XL8uloIO.dpuf]

Cuban Offshore Oil¶ Desperate to **end** U.S. dependence on oil from the Middle East, United States’ officials are certainly aware of Cuba’s oil-producing potential. In its 2004 assessment, the U.S. Geological Survey found that Cuba has 5 billion barrels of crude oil off its northern shores; Havana claims it has 20 billion . Five billion barrels would put Cuba on par with Colombia or Ecuador, while 20 billion barrels would make Cuba’s oil capacity comparable to that of the United States’ and place it among the top 15 oil reserves nations in the world. Either way, Cuba’s oil is attracting the attention of oil companies from around the globe. At the moment, Spain’s Repsol, Brazil’s Petrobras, and Norway’s StatoilHydro are overseeing exploratory drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. India, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Venezuela also have signed deals with Cuba.¶ Havana has publicly stated that it welcomes American investment, but U.S. companies are incapable of proceeding without an official go-ahead from Washington. As Juan Fleites, vice president of Havana’s state oil company Cubapetroleo, said, “We are open to U.S. oil companies interested in exploration, production and services.” U.S. oil tycoons have shown definite interest, but Kurt Glaubitz, a spokesman for Chevron, explained, “Until trade barriers are removed, Chevron is unable to do business in Cuba. Companies like us would have to see a change in U.S. policy before we evaluate whether there’s interest.” The aforementioned foreign companies already have contracted for 21 of the 59 offshore Cuban drilling blocks, and another 23 blocks are currently under negotiation by other foreign nations, including Russia and China.¶ A U.S. Stake in Cuban Oil?¶ It is not too late for the U.S. to develop a stake in Cuba’s nascent oil output. It takes between three and five years to develop oil reserves, and as of yet, there has been no major oil discovery off the island. Repsol struck oil in 2004, but not enough to sell commercially. Several other foreign firms are currently using seismic testing, which assesses the oil content of potential deposits, after which they will probably begin exploring in 2010 or 2011. The exploration manager for Cubapetroleo, Rafael Tenreyro Pérez, has called the incoming results from seismic testing in Cuba’s reserves “very encouraging.”¶ After lifting the embargo, U.S. oil companies could most likely work out an arrangement whereby the U.S. would exchange its reserves with nearby holdings of foreign companies, allowing the U.S. access to Cuba’s oil even after all of the contracts have been signed. This could appreciably save transportation costs, because U.S. companies wouldn’t have to go halfway around the world in search of oil refineries, with Cuba only 90 miles away.¶ U.S. oil equipment and service companies like Halliburton, however, already have lost the opportunity to build refineries, pipelines, and ports, sacrificing tens of millions of dollars in revenue. U.S. companies’ oil contracts are not just significant for their own potential profits, but also for American consumers’ access to reasonably priced neighboring oil. With oil prices recovering from a December low of $32.40 a barrel back to around $70 a barrel, access to more oil sources could become a matter of serious import.

**New oil markets makes Saudis *perceive* decline in US-Saudi ties.**

**House ‘12**

(not oft-disgruntled House, M.D., but Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, Karen Elliott House. Carnegie Council Transcripts and Articles – November 30, 2012 – lexis)

QUESTION: Warren Hoge[28], International Peace Institute.¶ Karen, there's a lot of talk in American politics about the desire to become energy independent, no longer dependent upon countries like Saudi Arabia, and there's a real possibility that could happen. The numbers are there, fracking and offshore oil, that sort of thing. Suppose that does happen. How would that **affect our relationship with Saudi Arabia**, **and is this something the Saudis themselves worry about?**¶KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE: **I don't think they like it when we talk about energy independence**. **They** do **take that as a personal insult**. I think it would loosen somewhat our sense of dependence. But the global economy is still going to be not we so much; I mean we're not a major importer of Saudi oil now but the global economy is a major importer of Saudi oil and will continue to be.¶ There are a lot of people, like John Deutch[29], who is a very smart man and certainly knows energy, who believes that it doesn't matter who runs Saudi Arabia, they will export oil. And they obviously will export some. But if you assume that if anything happened to take the royal family out of the picture, the only other organized structure because nothing is allowed to organize, no book clubs, no photography clubs, no soccer leagues other than the one the government runs is the religious organization. There are 70,000 mosques all over the country. That's basically one for every 150 men. So that's the most organized group.

**Cuban supplies differ from US supplies. They have *heavy crude oil***.

**Alhaiji & Maris ‘4**

[Dr. A. F. Alhajji is an energy economist and George Patton Chair of Business and Economics at the College of Business Administration at Ohio Northern, Terry L. Maris is the founding executive director of the Center for Cuban. Business Studies and professor of management, “The Future of Cuba’s Energy Sector,” Cuba Today, 2004, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/cubatodaybookcomplete.pdf#page=105]

The Institute for Cuban & Cuban American studies states on its web site¶ that oil was discovered in Cuba in 1914. In a different location, it indicates¶ that oil was first discovered in 1881, about 20 years after its commercial discovery¶ in the United States.4 However, it was not developed commercially¶ until the early 1930s. The USGS estimates that Cuban waters may contain¶ about 4 billion barrels of oil. Several political and economic factors have limited¶ the development of Cuban oil. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the¶ loss of Soviet oil shipments forced Cuba to increase its exploration activities¶ and develop its oil resources. Several reports estimate proven oil reserves to¶ be between 510 million barrels5 (mb) and 750 mb in 2004.6 Even conservative estimates reflect a substantial increase in Cuba’s oil reserves in recent years, which stood at 284mb in 2001. All current crude comes from onshore fields. Almost all Cuban crude is **heavy** with high sulfur content. Cuba needs to find light crude oil reseres in order to achieve its goal of self sufficiency.

**US Shale boom doesn’t trigger the link – *overstated supply.***

**Husain ‘13**

[internally quoting Dr Bassam Fattouh, the Director of the Oil and Middle East Programme at the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, Research Fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford University and professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies was in Dhahran. Syed Rashid Husain, Energy Columnist at Saudi Gazette, CEO at Husain's Associates, Toronto, CANADA, Vice President at Al-Azzaz Est; Education: Institute of Business Administration, 6/2/13, “Breaking down US energy independence hype,” Dawn, http://beta.dawn.com/news/1015486/breaking-down-us-energy-independence-hype]

Last week, Dr Bassam Fattouh, the Director of the Oil and Middle East Programme at the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, Research Fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford University and professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies was in Dhahran, talking about the ongoing revolution in the energy world, the challenges it presents and, ‘the disconnect’ between the hype that Washington is soon to be free of dependence on the oil rich Middle East and the reality.¶ Can Washington really be on a solo flight? Would the geopolitics of the oil rich Middle East about to change on account of the shale revolution? Isn’t all this for domestic political consumption?¶ Fattouh kept countering and discarding the arguments of the hype mongers — one after the other. He underlined in very clear terms, that no shale revolution would have taken place without the sustained high crude market prices. The prices, he said, has been one of the major ‘enablers’ of this revolution.¶ While many in the industry continue to argue that crude markets are about to turn soft — rather considerably — due to the weakening market fundamentals, yet Fattouh says the possibility of a price meltdown is not too high.¶ Even today producers are hedging their output in mid 90s, indicating that the prices may continue to be around the current price level. And then the ongoing shale revolution owes its origin to cheap capitals — made available by the governments all around.¶ He argued that looking at the incremental supplies from the US; one might get an impression of abundance. But that is not the case — he countered.¶ “Despite the sloppy global demand, why are the oil prices not going down?” he questioned. An interesting counter argument indeed.¶ The US developments alone could not transform the global markets, he emphasised. Other factors, such as continued dwindling demand in the US and the rest of the world, non-Opec production scenario, squeeze on Opec and lack of cohesion within the producers’ group, could lead to that. And with situation about the above issues not very clear, the current ongoing hype is only adding to uncertainty in the markets.¶ Fattouh also raised questions about the sustainability of the US output, underlining that 90 per cent of the output from Bakken and Eagle Ford are coming from 5/6 counties while the decline rates in the wells are considerable. Consequently, to ensure steady growth, the numbers of wells being drilled are on rise.¶ Turning to the evolving market, he pointed out that US domestic production has led to lack of demand of light and medium crude. However, demand for the heavy crude, produced by the Saudi Arabia is there.¶ And in the meantime, due to price discount the Canadian producers need to provide to their customers, the growth in Canadian output is slowing down, resulting in continued US imports from the Middle East, the director at the Oxford Institute for Energy Research underlined.

**US Shale is *too short term* to bridge energy independence.**

**Business Insider ‘13**

[Arthur Berman, (quoted in article) Oil Analyst, Labyrinth Consulting Services, 1/20/2013, “Oil Guru Destroys All Of The Hype About America's Energy Boom,” Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/arthur-berman-shale-is-magical-thinking-2013-1?op=1#ixzz2WKIYV4kB]

Not everyone believes the U.S. is capable of becoming energy independent thanks to its shale oil and gas reserves, as the International Energy Association suggested recently.¶ The math just doesn't work out, they say — **America consumes too much**. ¶ But some are even more skeptical than that.¶ Arthur Berman, an oil analyst with Labyrinth Consulting Services, says the promise of America's shale reserves have been vastly overstated.¶ His main argument: Shale is too expensive to drill, and shale wells usually don't last longer than a couple of years.¶ Last year, he laid out his case at a gathering of the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas in Austin Texas.¶ With his permission, we've reproduced it here.¶ Berman argues the promise of America's shale revolution is **"magical thinking."** Shale drilling is too expensive and too ephemeral to make a lasting impact.¶ There tends to be a huge gap between the estimated amount recoverable and what actually ends up getting recovered.¶ Shale is the most expensive and most complicated source of energy.¶ The amount of product shale has contributed to overall consumption has been relatively minuscule.¶ The gap between production and consumption is 9 million barrels of oil a day. "It is unlikely that the U.S. will become energy independent," Berman argues.¶ Berman focuses on the Bakken oil play in North Dakota. As of last summer it had 236 rigs, second highest in the nation.¶ He says Bakken oil production has increased to 573,000 barrels per day from 4874 producing wells. The average well is 118 barrels of oil per day, and each well costs $11.5 million.¶ But the Bakken has a 38 percent decline rate, according to Berman — meaning if you stopped drilling now, you'd lose 38% of your production after a year.¶ He says there was no improvement in well efficiency between 2010 and 2011. In some cases it's taking increasing numbers of wells to get the same amount of product. Berman says the costs are "astronomical."¶ The Bakken is already going at a breakneck rate — there's now very little production coming from wells older than a few years.¶ We can see the same phenomenon occurring in other shale plays like the Eagle Ford in Texas.¶ The number of currently viable wells in the Bakken has dwindled.¶ In conclusion: America's gains from shale will be short-lived, and certainly won't be our bridge to independence.

**US fracking won’t unlock an oil independence– the product’s *quality* is too low.**

**Owen ‘13**

[Jane Owen, resident and founder of Citizens League for Environmental Action Now (CLEAN), “Long-Term Costs Of Fracking Are Staggering,” Climate Progress, 03/19/2013, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/03/19/1742171/long-term-costs-of-fracking-are-staggering/?mobile=nc]

All the hype by the fossil fuel industry about energy independence from fracking (hydraulic fracturing) in tight gas reservoirs like the Barnett Shale has left out the costs in energy, water and other essential natural resources.¶ Furthermore, a recent report from the Post Carbon Institute finds that projections for an energy boom from non-conventional fossil fuel sources is not all it’s cracked up to be.¶ The report cites a study by David Hughes, Canadian geologist, who says **the low quality** of hydrocarbons from bitumen – shale oil and shale gas – do not provide the same energy returns as conventional hydrocarbons due to the energy needed to extract or upgrade them. Hughes also notes that the “new age of energy abundance” forecast by the industry will soon run dry because shale gas and shale oil wells deplete quickly. In fact, the “best fields have already been tapped.”¶ “Unconventional fossil fuels all share a host of cruel and limiting traits,” says Hughes. “They offer dramatically fewer energy returns; they consume extreme and endless flows of capital; they provide difficult or volatile rates of supply over time and have large environmental impacts in their extraction.”

**Large untapped reserves in Cuba**

**Sadowski ‘11**

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A U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba’s offshore¶ oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels of recoverable¶ oil and ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas.29 Cupet, the¶ state-owned Cuban energy company, insists that actual reserves¶ are double that of the U.S. estimate.30 One estimate indicates¶ that Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day.31¶ Given this vast resource, Cuba has already leased offshore oil¶ exploration blocks to operators from Spain, Norway, and India.32¶ Offshore oil discoveries in Cuba are placing increasing pressure¶ for the United States to end the embargo. First, U.S. energy companies¶ are eager to compete for access to Cuban oil reserves.33¶ Secondly, fears of a Cuban oil spill are argued to warrant U.S.¶ investment and technology.34 Finally, the concern over Cuban¶ offshore drilling renews cries that the embargo is largely a failure¶ and harms human rights.

**Old studies wrong – large untapped reserves exist.**

**Schenk ‘10**

Christopher J. Schenk is Project Chief of the U.S. National Oil and Gas Assessment – ¶ GEOLOGIC ASSESSMENT OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS RESOURCES OF THE NORTH CUBA BASIN, CUBA – http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1029/pdf/OF10-1029.pdf

The potential for undiscovered petroleum resources of the North Cuba Basin historically has focused on the heavy oil fields of the onshore fold and thrust belt (Echevarria-Rodriguez and others, 1991; Pindell, 1991; Petzet, 2000; Oil and Gas Journal, 1993, 2000, 2002,¶ 2005), but recent efforts have focused **on the offshore potential** (fig.7) (Vassalli and others,¶ 2003; Moretti and others, 2003a,b; Magnier and others, 2004). This study indicates that the offshore of the North Cuba Basin **might have significant potential for undiscovered oil and gas resources** (Schenk, 2008).

**Oil independence deteriorates US-Saudi ties**

**Tanter ‘12**

[RAYMOND TANTER, Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan; President of Iran Policy Committee Publishing; and former member of the National Security Council staff in the Reagan-Bush Administration, “The Geopolitics of U.S. Energy Independence,” International Economy, Summer 2012, http://www.international-economy.com/TIE\_Su12\_GeopoliticsEnergySymp.pdf]

At issue is whether energy independence will cause¶ a revision of U.S. national security policy. Because¶ energy is only one of the drivers, energy independence¶ is unlikely to have the major effect implied by the¶ Verleger thesis. During the Cold War, American participation¶ in the Korean and Vietnam Wars did not have¶ energy as a driver; likewise, energy is not at the core of U.S. long-term commitments to South Korea and Japan in the post-Cold War era. Shared values, prior commitments, and strategic calculations are more important than energy regarding countries such as Israel. In my experience on the National Security Council staff in the 1980s, there was little discussion of energy in relation to Israel. Ditto for Turkey. Control of energy was more important than values and commitments for Washington to save Kuwait after Iraq’s invasion in the first Gulf War, but not relevant to the takedown of Saddam Hussein a decade later, and irrelevant to the post-September 11 invasion of Afghanistan to defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban. With respect to Iran, energy was a factor in the cooperation of American and British intelligence to overthrow the Mosaddeq government in 1953, but proliferation concerns trump energy a half century later. Concerning Saudi¶ Arabia, energy is at the heart of the relationship. So rising¶ oil prices and production costs, declining reserves, and¶ increasingly available alternative fuels as well as **nonconventional¶ sources of oil are bound to make Riyadh of¶ less consequence to Washington than it is today.**¶ Saudi Arabia’s comparative advantage in oil production¶ and the world economy’s thirst for oil converged to¶ make the Kingdom a strategic ally in the past. But the¶ odds that the Kingdom will survive the spreading Arab¶ revolts are not high, and the American commitment to the¶ royal family is mainly against external, not internal,¶ threats. Hence, coming to the defense of the Kingdom is¶ likely to be perceived in Washington as too costly when¶ the threat is from within.¶ With European countries becoming more dependent¶ on Russia for energy supplies, and Russia as well as Germany¶ becoming closer economic partners, the likelihood¶ of out-of-area involvement by NATO in such places as¶ Afghanistan is not high. And as the saying goes, “Out of¶ area or out of business!” Verleger suggests that American¶ energy independence could make this era the “New American¶ Century” by creating an economic environment¶ where the United States enjoys access to energy supplies¶ at much lower cost than other parts of the world and giving¶ the U.S. economy an edge over other nations, particularly¶ northern Europe. In the context of enhanced¶ American energy independence, the Obama Administration’s¶ pivot to Asia is likely to be of more import for¶ Europe than the Middle East. Finally, U.S. energy independence¶ is likely to reinforce isolationist foreign policy¶ tendencies already in force in the United States. A gamechanging¶ event like an Iranian nuclear weapon could wipe¶ out the tide toward isolationism.

**US-Saudi interaction is fully dependent on oil – the plan removes that link**

**Congregalli ‘13**

[Matteo Congregalli, International Politics Journalist, “Without Oil. Without Allies: USA and the New American Dream of Independent Energy,” Urban Times, 2/15/13, http://urbantimes.co/magazine/2013/02/usa-oil-saudi-arabia-independent-domestic-energy-supply/]

Examples of oil-diplomacy are known to be neither smooth nor easy. Take, for example, the harsh relations between the US and Colonel Gaddafi’s Libya; or the invasion of Iraq, back in 2003, whose justification was not uniquely about Saddam’s Weapons of Mass Destruction – as UN reports confirmed; or the closure of the Hormuz strait, back in 2011. Iran threatened to close the strait in retaliation to the massive burden of sanctions on the Islamic Republic. As an unlucky coincidence, almost 17 billion barrels pass through the strait, every day. The blockade imposed by the Iranian military Navy made the oil prices skyrocket in just few weeks.¶ Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the US was always based on mutual convenience. After 9/11, both Washington and Riyadh were allies in War on Terror. US wanted stability in the area. Later on, Saudi Arabia wanted to preserve their power in spite of the Arab Spring. US needed oil for a convenient price. Saudi Arabia needed arms.¶ In 2008, the US Senate struggled to approve a resolution to help cut soaring gasoline prices by providing the Saudi government with 900 cutting-edge military kits in return for increasing oil production. The resolution aimed at securing the Gulf area and winning support for the growing sanctions on Iran. Despite the potential revenue – about $20 billion – the decision was stalling at the Senate as the Saudis were not keen on downing the price of the crude oil from 75 cents to 50 cents per gallon.¶ “We are saying to the Saudis that, if you don’t help us, why should we be helping you? ” said the democratic Senator Chuck Schumer. “We are saying that we need real relief, and we need it quickly. You need our arms, but we need you to cooperate and not strangle American consumers.” The resolution passed, eventually.¶ According to statistics: throughout Bush’s terms, the arms dealing with Saudi doubled from $19 billion between 2001-2004 to $40 billion between 2005- 2008. In the last five years, under Obama’s administration, the deals reached $60 billion.¶ At the end of December 2011, the US Department of State held a press briefing about a further arms sale to Saudi Arabia. The agreement included 84 brand new F-15 combat aircrafts for an eight-figure sum: $30 billion. The Assistant secretary Andrew Shapiro declared:¶ “This agreement serves to reinforce the strong and enduring relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.”¶ No matter how much discounted oil you can get. Providing cutting-edge arms is also a strategy to ensure the stability of the region, crucial for American interests.¶ “There are geopolitical interests at stake, driving the arms deal. Saudi Arabia works with the US as they have a common strategy and common agreement,” says Farhang Moradi, senior lecturer in Globalisation and Development at University of Westminster, London.¶ Shipping F-15s to Riyadh is a first-line defence to empower the biggest US ally in the region. But¶ “We have to keep in mind that buying arms in respect of selling oil could be the case. However, buying advanced arms doesn’t put the Saudi in the position of defining the area from actors such as Iran.”¶ Security, first – The positions of the American military bases in the Persian Gulf (Image Source: Google Maps).¶ An additional security belt of air and ground bases extends all around Iran and the Persian Gulf. There are at least 21 bases in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Bahrain and Kuwait. The question we should answer is whether the military infrastructures are about to be left behind now that the burden of regional interests and energy need is shrinking.¶ “These bases are giving them the infrastructures to check and balance. It costs them something but the cost is worth it in order to manage the gulf,” says Moradi.¶ The military presence is a result of with oil production and the control of the political actors. The Gulf oil has always been a priority for the US. But in the age of the war on terror and the growing threat of a nuclear Iran, abandoning the battlefield is not a strategy-wise option. In the same regard, we should not expect the sanctions against Iran to diminish and that the US army will leave their bases anytime soon.¶ The real shift in the region could come in the long run.¶ “If US oil demands fall, it doesn’t mean that foreign demand won’t continue. Emerging countries suck oik; China, India, Turkey. They need oil on their routes to development” says Moradi.¶ According to many, in ten years time there will be a new producer-consumer relationship in the region. It will not involve the US anymore. Russia, China, India will be bounded by new energy ties.¶ “The demand for oil is going to be pretty good. Those producing oil are therefore going to export a lot. The balance of forces will change in terms of energy and power. Those changes will have subsequent effects upon other countries that may perceive themselves as competing powers against USA; China and Russia.”¶ This likely shift of interest will cause a scenario where China and India will discontinue being mere investors in the Middle East and Central Asia. In the near future they could install bases and military infrastructures in the region, while the American ones will be gone.¶ The de-Americanisation of the Gulf is yet to come. But the first signs are already emerging. At the beginning of February, the US secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta announced that just one aircraft carrier will be deployed in the Gulf instead of two. The decision is motivated by defence budget cuts. Is it a sign of the de-prioritisation of the control of the Gulf? Probably. In the meantime, the lowering security in the area, as well the US’ soft way of dealing with the Arab Spring, is making the Gulf States nervous. Are diplomatic relations facing a crisis? It is definitely a sign of an upcoming change.¶ The surge in US oil and natural gas production, which will scatter the American diplomatic ties, is not without reason. America suddenly found out that underneath their land, millions of barrels of sweet crude oil were reachable by merely changing the drilling technique. A well-known one is called ‘fracking’ which involves fracturing layers of rock and pumping water and sand in the well to get to the oil reserve. Tens of sites in the US were considered worthless till fracking was introduced. Fracturing the rocks allow to reach deep and huge oil reserves, otherwise out-of-the-way. That’s how the States are turning into a Saudi Arabia with burgers, baseball, and guns.

**Domestic politics block a reorientation in the US’ strategy.**

**Grandin 10** – teaches history at New York University and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Greg, “Empire's Senescence: U.S. Policy in Latin America,” *New Labor Forum*, 19:1, Winter 2010, pg. 14-23)//SJF

It’s not going to happen. Efforts to implement any one of the above policy changes would be **blocked by** powerful **domestic interests**. Take biofuels. The idea to liberalize the U.S. agricultural market—and have the rhetoric of free trade somewhat match the reality—is recommended by all mainstream think tanks, including the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, as an important step to win back Brazil. Obama recognizes the importance of Brazil, having nominated George W. Bush’s outgoing assistant secretary of state for Latin America, Thomas Shannon—respected in establishment circles as, according to the journal Foreign Policy, “the most talented and successful individual” to serve as Washington’s envoy to Latin America “in at least two decades”—as its ambassador. Yet Shannon’s confirmation had been threatened by Senator Chuck Grassley, representing the agro-industry state of Iowa, who objected to the then-nominee’s comment during his confirma- tion hearings that removing a fifty-four-cent per gallon tariff on imported ethanol would be good for U.S. foreign policy. The White House immediately declared that it had no plans to change tariff policy, and Grassley allowed the confirmation to proceed.5 The White House’s quick buckling probably has to do with its fruitless attempt to win over Grassley for health care reform, a further indicator of how **foreign policy is held hostage by domestic politics**. Similar obstacles stand in the way of other foreign policy reforms. The Cuban lobby, along with the broader conservative Right, prevents a normalization of relations with Havana. Fear of the National Rifle Association halts a renewal of the assault weapons ban. As to the “War on Drugs,” the Democratic Party is deeply committed to “Plan Colombia,” the centerpiece of that war. It is, after all, a legacy of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy, and much of the $6 billion spent to fight it thus far goes directly into the coffers of corporate sponsors of the Democratic Party like Connecticut’s United Technologies and other northeastern defense contractors (it was Bill Clinton who in 1997, acting on behalf of Lockheed Martin, lifted a twenty-year ban on high-tech weapons sales to Latin America, kicking off an arms build-up, in which Colombia, Chile, and Brazil have taken the lead).6 As to immigration reform—also recom- mended by influential establishment groups to improve U.S. standing in Latin America— Obama, in Mexico, said it would have to wait until next year. He has a near-filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and a large majority in the House, yet he says there aren’t enough votes and “there is not, by any means, con- sensus across the table.”7 Obama could easily assemble a majority coalition on this issue—comprised of business interests who want cheap labor, Hispanics, progressives, social justice Catholics, and members of the labor movement (who long ago signaled their support for immigration reform)—yet fear of a backlash fueled by a contracting economy has led him to back- burner the issue. The same conditions that make Latin America the best venue in which to modernize U.S. diplomacy—namely that there is no immediate threat emerging from the region, no equivalent of North Korea or Iran on the verge of acquiring a nuclear bomb, no insurgency bogging down U.S. troops as in Afghanistan, and no conflict threatening access to vital resources (Washington’s main antagonist in the region, Venezuela, continues to sell most of its oil to the U.S.)—also mean that there are no real incentives for Obama’s fledgling foreign policy coalition to expend political capital on trying to improve policy there. Analysts of the American empire—from Charles A. Beard in the 1930s to William Appleman Williams in the 1960s and 1970s— have emphasized the U.S.’s unique ability to subsume competing economic, ideological, and sectional interests into a flexible and vital diplomacy in defense of a general “national interest,” which has led America to unprec- edented global power.8 Yet now—confronted with a sustained economic contraction, the fallout from a disastrous overleveraging of military power in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a post-Cold War, post-neoliberal world with multiple power centers—expansion has given way to involution. **The** U.S. **political system seems to be** literally **devouring itself from within, paralyzing the ability of foreign policymakers to adjust** to a rapidly changing world. Unable to leverage its soft, smart power even in its own hemisphere, Washington is ever more dependent on the military and corporate mercenary forces that have transformed Colombia into a citadel of U.S. hard power in the Andes.

**Unworkable land and long-time frame**

**Soligo ‘10**

et al; Ronald Soligo is a professor emeritus of economics at Rice University and a Rice scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. The author writes a chapter within the book “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication, edited by Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska –obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 102

Three and a half billion gallons seems unrealistic for the foreseeable future. There is some question as to whether Cuba could ever again attain the 1.5 million hectares of sugarcane harvested in 1970, let alone 2 million. According to Brian Pollitt, the 1970 harvest was achieved only by cutting cane that would normally be left to mature for another season in order to produce a higher sugar yield in the following year. 48 Obviously this is not a sustainable practice if optimal yields are to be achieved. Two billion gallons can be produced with a harvested area of 1.33 million hectares and a yield of seventy-five tons per hectare. That area of cultivation is not too far from the average harvest of 1.28 million hectares that Cuba was able to maintain during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet reaching 1.33 million hectares will require time and substantial investment in farm machinery and restoration of the land, which has been neglected and compacted by the use of heavy Soviet-built harvesting machinery. The land will also have to be tilled and newly planted with sugarcane. Achieving higher sugarcane yields will also require time and investments to acquire or develop higher-yielding sugarcane varieties. Cuban yields averaged only fifty-eight tons per hectare during the 1970s and 1980s, substantially below the seventy-five tons per hectare needed to produce 2 billion gallons of ethanol. Yet other countries, as noted, have achieved or exceeded that yield, and some private Cuban farmers are reported to have achieved even higher yields of 100 tons per acre. 49 Yields, of course, are a function of other factors besides cane variety. The condition of the land, access to water and fertilizer, and other inputs would all need to be considered.

**Castro hates it**

**Specht ’12** (Jonathan – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc. B.A., Louisiana State University, 2009; J.D.,¶ Washington University in St. Louis 2012. “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States” – ExpressO – <http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf>)

To speak of a Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry is, at this point, largely¶ a matter of speculation.¶ 46¶ Because of the anti-ethanol views of Fidel Castro (who¶ has said that ethanol should be discouraged because it diverts crops from food to¶ fuel),¶ 47¶ Cuba currently has almost no ethanol industry. In the words of Ronald¶ Soligo and Amy Myers Jaffe of the Brookings Institution, “Despite the fact that¶ Cuba is dependent on oil imports and is aware of the demonstrated success of¶ Brazil in using ethanol to achieve energy self-sufficiency, it has not embarked¶ on a policy to develop a larger ethanol industry from sugarcane.”¶ 48¶ There is,¶ however, no reason why such an industry cannot be developed. As Soligo and¶ Jaffe wrote, “In addition, Cuba has large land areas that once produced sugar but¶ now lie idle. These could be revived to provide a basis for a world-class ethanol¶ industry. We estimate that if Cuba achieves the yield levels attained in¶ Nicaragua and Brazil and the area planted with sugarcane approaches levels¶ seen in the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba coul¶ d produce up to 2 billion gallons of¶ sugar-based ethanol per year.”¶ 4

**Fidel’s shadow**

**Frank ‘8** Havana-based Reuters correspondent Marc Frank is a former writer for the People's Daily World – Reuters – Feb 22, 2008 – http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/22/cuba-castro-ethanol-idUSN2261316320080222

Cuba will only jump on the ethanol bandwagon if it can produce the biofuel from sugar cane as a by-product that does not affect its sugar output, local experts said on Friday.¶ Fidel Castro's retirement this week fueled speculation that ethanol could become a billion-dollar export industry for the cash-strapped communist country under his brother Raul Castro.¶ The younger Castro, who is expected to be confirmed as Cuba's new leader on Sunday, is considered less ideological and more pragmatic than his brother, and has indicated an interest in drawing more foreign investment in recent speeches.¶ But Fidel Castro is expected to retain huge influence in Cuba and he has repeatedly branded the use of food crops to produce fuel as a crime against humanity because rising prices will increase hunger.¶ A local economist with ties to the sugar industry said Cuba is working to develop technology to produce fuel from milled sugar cane bagasse. If successful, Cuba could become more interested in making ethanol, he said.¶ "It is inconceivable while Fidel is still alive that his brother Raul, or anyone else, would convert a significant proportion of our sugar crop or vacant land to ethanol," the economist said, asking not to be identified.¶ "Even after Fidel dies, I can't imagine that happening for quite some time," he said.

# 1NR

#### Failed transition collapses Cuba---prevents effective investment flows---turns the Aff

Naím, 1 – editor of Foreign Policy (MOISÉS, “When Countries go Crazy”, MARCH 1, 2001, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/03/01/when\_countries\_go\_crazy)//eek

Some countries can drive other countries crazy. When people have this effect on one another, it is because of imbalances in the brain’s neurotransmitters. With countries, it often happens because of the disproportionate influence of special interests. Cuba, for example, has long driven the United States crazy. Just think of the Bay of Pigs invasion or the outsourcing of Castro's assassination to the Mafia. For more recent examples of irrational behavior, think of the Helms-Burton Law or Elián. The problem is that Cuba not only drives the United States crazy but also seems to induce some acute form of learning disability among U.S. politicians. Cuba makes them forget -- or unlearn -- everything the world has painfully discovered about the transition from communism. This knowledge can be distilled into five simple maxims: Lesson one: Failure is more common than success in the transition to a democratic market economy. Lesson two: The less internationally integrated, more centralized, and more personalized a former communist regime was, the more traumatic and unsuccessful its transition will be. Lesson three: Dismantling a communist state is far easier and faster than building a functional replacement for it. Lesson four: The brutal, criminal ways of a powerful Communist party with a tight grip on public institutions are usually supplanted by the brutal, criminal ways of powerful private business conglomerates with a tight grip on public institutions. Lesson five: Introducing a market economy without a strong and effective state capable of regulating it gives resourceful entrepreneurs more incentive to emulate Al Capone than Bill Gates. It is therefore safe to assume that if the Castro regime suddenly implodes, Cuba will end up looking more like Albania than the Bahamas. But that is not the assumption on which U.S politicians base their efforts to hasten Castro's demise. Although a lot of money, political capital, and thought have been expended trying to overthrow the Cuban government, ideas about what to do the morning after are scarce and often unrealistic. They usually hinge on the expectation that in the post-Castro era democracy will emerge and Cuban-American exiles will lead other investors in transforming Cuba into a capitalist hub. More likely is that instead of a massive flow of foreign investment into Cuba, the United States will get a massive inflow of refugees escaping the chaos of a post-Castro regime. Frictions between Cuban-Cubans and Miami-Cubans will make politics nasty and unstable. New investments and privatizations will be mired in the legal mess produced by the 5,911 claims to property in Cuba (valued at more than $17 billion) that have been filed with the United States Claims Commission by former property owners. (That amounts to nearly seven years' worth of Cuban exports.) The Cuban public sector is inextricably intertwined with the Communist Party, so the demise of the party will paralyze the government, at least for a while. And the cost of any resulting humanitarian crisis will mainly be borne by U.S. taxpayers, who will likely pay much more than the $2 billion spent containing the influx of Haitian refugees in 1994. But can't the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund support Cuba's transition with money, experts, and projects? Sure, except that the United States forbids them from spending even a dollar to prepare themselves and Cuba for the coming transition. The result is that these institutions are not ready to help Cuba. Again, the United States forgets a useful lesson from another continent: The day after Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin shook hands at the White House in 1993, the World Bank -- ­­­which had been instructed to prepare for the event -- was immediately ready to lend and invest in projects under the control of the Palestinian Authority, even though the authority was not and still is not a member of the bank. Allowing such an initiative in Cuba's case would cost U.S. taxpayers nothing and would help plan for the challenges ahead. Also, training Cuban professionals to run a modern market economy is bound to be a better investment for the United States than blocking academic exchanges with the island. The rational, self-interested approach for the United States that also avoids much future human pain in Cuba is to concentrate all efforts on ensuring as smooth a transition as possible. This view, of course, is not shared by all. U.S. Senator Jesse Helms recently said that "the opponents of the Cuban embargo are about to run into a brick wall on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. President Bush is a committed supporter of the embargo." The failure of the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba to achieve its stated objectives over the last 40 years is dismissed by Senator Helms and some Cuban-Americans who argue that the embargo has never been vigorously implemented. Perhaps, as Senator Helms predicts, things are about to change and the aging Cuban dictator will finally fall. If Cuba collapses and becomes a failed state 90 miles away from U.S. shores, the epicenter of the Caribbean drug trade, the source of a massive flood of refugees to the United States, a corruption haven, and a black hole for substantial sums of U.S. aid, President Bush will have no one to blame but himself. Or, more precisely, the powerful interest groups that blinded him to the lessons of experience.

#### Severing unconditionality is uniquely meaningful on an engagement topic. If you don’t specify, you’re unconditional

**Kahler, 6** - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)

Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid pro quo on the part of the target country and policies that are unconditional.1 Conditional policies, sometimes labeled linkage or economic 'carrots', are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with economic loss (sanction) in the absence of policy change, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic benefits in return for desired policy change. Drezner (1999/2000) has proposed several plausible predictions regarding the employment of conditional strategies and the conditions of their success. He argues that the successful use of economic engagement is most likely between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used.

The success of a conditional engagement strategy should also be contingent on a state's influence over domestic firms. If those firms find market-based transactions with the target state unappealing, a government pursuing a conditional strategy must convince them to deal with the target when desired change occurs. On the other hand, if domestic firms have strong economic incentives to conduct economic transactions with the target state, a successful conditional strategy must prevent them from pursuing their economic exchange in the absence of the desired change in a target states behavior. In this regard, democracies may have a harder time pursuing a conditional strategy: in a democratic setting, firms are likely to be openly critical of politicians who try to restrict their commercial activities and will support candidates who do not place such demands on them. Our first hypothesis (HI), therefore, is that conditional engagement strategies will be less likely to succeed if the initiating state is a democracy, especially when underlying economic incentives to trade with or invest in the target state are strong.2

Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive than conditional variants in that they do not include a specific quid pro quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, change the target's foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict. How increased economic integration at the bilateral level might produce an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus explanation exists (e.g. Russett & Oneal, 2001; Oneal & Russett, 1999; for less sanguine results, see Barbieri, 1996). At a minimum, state leaders might seek to exploit two causal pathways by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that reshapes the goals of the target state.

#### These are distinct strategies with meaningful policy differences

**Kahler, 6** - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)

We begin by developing a theoretical framework through which to examine strategies of economic engagement. Drawing from the existing literature, our framework distinguishes between different forms of economic engagement, and outlines the factors likely to facilitate or undermine the implementation of these different strategies. With this framework as a guide, we then examine the strategic use of economic interdependence—focusing in particular on economic engagement—in three East Asian States: South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. We use these case studies to draw conclusions about the underlying factors that facilitate the use of a strategy of economic engagement, that determine the particular type of engagement strategy used, and that help to predict the likelihood of success. Because our conclusions are primarily derived inductively from a small number of cases, we are cautious in making claims of generalizability. Nonetheless, it is our hope that the narratives we provide and the conclusions that we draw from them will help to spur further research into this interesting yet under-studied subject.

#### “Substantial” requires certainty

Words and Phrases 64 (40W&P 759)

The words" outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain: absolute: real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

#### Resolved means definite

**Random House 6** (Unabridged Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolve)

re·solve Audio Help /rɪˈzɒlv/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled Pronunciation~~[ri-zolv~~] Pronunciation Key - Show IPA Pronunciation verb, -solved, -solv·ing, noun

–verb (used with object)

1. to come to a definite or earnest decision about; determine (to do something): I have resolved that I shall live to the full.